A TRIAL JUDGE'S VIEW OF TORT REFORM
Honorable Dickinson . Debevoise*
It is a privilege to be asked to give the Arthur T. Vanderbilt
Lecture sponsored by the Harvard Law School Association of New
Jersey. The Vanderbilt name evokes a time when legal giants
strode the earth, and the late Chief Justice was in the forefront of
these giants.
I reread the tributes to him which appeared in a volume of the
NewJersey Reports just after his death in September, 1957 and was
reminded once again of the extraordinary contributions he made
in three distinct roles - political leader, legal educator and Chief
Justice of a great court.
My own associations with him were humble indeed - delivering books from Chief Judge Forman, for whom I clerked, to the
ChiefJustice at his home in Short Hills, and standing before him in
the beautiful courtroom in the State House Annex as Chief Justice
Vanderbilt administered the oath to new attorneys.
Early in my legal career a sentence jumped out of a Vanderbilt
opinion which has remained with me ever since. I shall return to
that sentence at the conclusion of my remarks.
When I read the list of previous Vanderbilt lecturers I wonder
why your president, Josh Levin, selected me for this role. I am not
a scholar nor a wise appellate judge or justice. I am simply a trial
judge who, day after day must deal with subjects about which he
knows very little, if anything.
This was brought home to me forcefully a few years ago when,
late one afternoon, an application for a temporary restraining order arrived my way. I glanced quickly at the papers, noticing that
they had something to do with sports. The case was entitled
Bridgeman v. NBA. I donned my robe and swept majestically into
the courtroom. A crowd of lawyers awaited. I introduced the session, stating that "I see we have the case of Bridgeman v. National
BaseballAssociation." The lawyers rose in a body, 'Judge, it's basketball, not baseball."
My subject tonight is a trial judge's view of tort reform. I suspect that when I have finished, there will be those who conclude
* Senior U.S. Judge, District of New Jersey. This article is a reproduction of the
Arthur T. Vanderbilt Lecture given by Judge Debevoise before sponsors of the event,
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that I know even less about torts than I do about professional
sports.
My thesis is quite simple. It is this: by expanding the kinds of
cases in which plaintiffs can recover damages, by permitting virtually uncontrolled recoveries for pain and suffering and for punitive
damages, courts have actually injured the classes of persons they
have sought to help.
I am not addressing the broad economic effects of our present
tort law, whether it discourages innovative medical treatment and
product advances, whether it drives insurance rates so high that
businesses and non-profit organizations cannot function, whether
jobs are lost because of the tort law's effects upon the competitive
position of American businesses. These are questions for economists and former Vice President Quayle. I simply want to recount
observations from the perspective of the courtroom. The incidents
are anecdotal, but I think they suggest that we do indeed have
some problems.
It seems to me that the priorities in any system of compensation must be, first - to provide for the medical treatment and rehabilitation of the victim and, second - to replace lost income,
past and future. Of secondary importance is an award for pain and
suffering and of truly low priority is an award for punitive damages.
Yet today, particularly in the area of mass torts, we see some
fortunate plaintiffs recovering large awards, which include substantial amounts for pain and suffering and often for punitive damages,
while thousands of other injured plaintiffs wait and receive nothing
not even for medical expenses or for lost income. It may well be
that the huge initial awards have bankrupted the defendant or defendants, exhausted their insurance and there will never be a recovery for the unlucky thousands. This might well be described as
the jackpot theory of justice.
We have seen this phenomenon in the asbestos cases. There
have been many substantial jury awards, and, on the eve of trial,
faced with the in terrorem effect of such awards, substantial settlements. In those cases the plaintiffs, and their attorneys who have
received their contingent fees, have fared well. But the thousands
of unpaid plaintiffs, many of whom have suffered grievous losses,
wait.
The courts have acted with extraordinary creativity to deal
with this kind of problem - for example, note the work of Judge
Weinstein in New York, Judge Weiner and other district court
judges in Philadelphia and Judge Keefe here in NewJersey. But, I
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would suggest, the system within which they have to work is badly
skewed. There are limited resources to pay awards, and before
these resources are used to pay huge amounts for pain and suffering and any amounts for punitive damages, every victim should
have been compensated for his medical and rehabilitation expenses and loss of income.
Our law of damages is largely the product of the common law
court made law. Courts and individual judges are inevitably
moved by the predicaments of the individual parties who appear
before them. In the case of an injured plaintiff and a defendant
who has committed a tort, particularly where the defendant is insured, natural sympathies move a court to be as generous as possible to the injured person. But by succumbing too easily to these
sentiments in an effort to do good in a particular case, courts may
in fact be doing great harm.
First let's look at the area of pain and suffering. It is certainly
not unreasonable for a victim to receive some monetary compensation for pain and suffering. But there is no escaping the subjectiveness of this question and the fact that some losses simply cannot be
made whole with money. By improvidently expanding the kinds of
injuries for which pain and suffering awards can be recovered, and
by placing virtually no limits upon the amounts of such awards, we
have contributed to the situation where some plaintiffs receive
huge awards and many receive nothing.
The NewJersey Supreme Court's decision in Portee v. Jaffee,' in
combination with its earlier decision of Falzone v. Busch,2 represents
to me a situation where a court unwisely expanded the kind of situation where a person could sue for emotional injury. The circumstances would tear at one's heartstrings. A mother had to stand by
for 4-1/2 hours as her seven year old son was trapped and crushed
between the elevator door and the wall of the building. The boy
died while still trapped, his mother a helpless observer. The Court
allowed the mother to recover for emotional distress.
In combination Falzone and Portee overruled previous law to
the effect that some physical impact upon the plaintiff was required before there could be recovery for emotional injuries
caused by a negligent defendant. Recognizing the potential for expansive use of this new law, in Portee the Supreme Court sought to
define with precision the circumstances in which recovery would
1 84 N.J. 88 (1980).
2 45 NJ. 559 (1965).
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be permitted. One requirement was a marital or intimate, familial
relationship between plaintiff and the injured person.
However, time erodes the best intentions, and last June the
Court expanded a marital or intimate familial relationship to include cohabiting persons. In Dunphy v. Gregor,' the test became
whether the bystander who observed the victim's injury had a relationship with the victim that was substantial, stable and enduring. I
leave it to your imagination to conjure up the circumstances in
which a bystander will seek to persuade a jury that he or she had a
substantial, stable and enduring relationship with an injured
person.
This expansion of the circumstances in which a person can
recover for emotional distress must be viewed in conjunction with
the huge amounts which can be recovered for pain, suffering, emotional distress. No dollar figure could ever compensate a parent
for the loss of a child. This being the case, a jury or a judge can
award practically any sum.
How unpredictable this factor is was illustrated for me this past
fall in a products liability case. The plaintiffs right hand had been
crushed in the rollers of a textile machine. The injuries were severe; the pain and suffering were great and continuing. I submitted the case to the jury with the usual charges on the subject. On
the third day, just before the jury was to announce a verdict, the
parties settled for $845,000.
It is my practice when a civil case settles during a trial to hold a
panel discussion with the jurors and the attorneys. The attorneys
can question the jurors and the jurors can critique the attorneys.
During the course of these discussions in this particular case it developed that no verdict had been reached during the first two days
because one juror held out for a verdict of no liability. He was won
over on the third day. On the question of damages, most of which
was for pain and suffering, one juror sought to award $10,000,000.
Agreement was ultimately reached at $3,500,000.
You might think that the plaintiff and his attorney would have
been kicking themselves for accepting a mere $845,000. Actually
not. The defendant was a Dutch company; it had no business or
assets in the United States; there was no treaty under which the
Netherlands was obligated to enforce a judgment of an American
court. Apparently, a judgment for anything approaching
$3,500,000 would have been against public policy if plaintiff sought
3
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to enforce it in the Netherlands. There would have been a new
trial at least as to damages, at which time the huge amount for pain
and suffering would have been drastically reduced. I will have
more to say about Dutch law in a moment.
I am not suggesting that there is something inherently wrong
with pain and suffering awards. I am suggesting that it is bad public policy to permit enormous awards for that kind of injury before
assuring that all victims can at least recover their medical expenses
and lost income.
There are indications that some courts are becoming more
conscious of the overall consequences of increasing awards for intangible injuries. A year ago, the California Supreme Court was
asked to introduce bystander liability. In Huggans v. Longs Drug
Stores,4 a pharmacy had negligently provided an improper drug
dosage for the two month-old child of the plaintiff parents. Among
other damages the parents sought recovery for emotional distress.
The court declined to permit such damages, reasoning that: (i)
the potential liability of all health providers would be enlarged; (ii)
malpractice premiums would be increased; and (iii) all medical
costs would be increased.
I don't know that the Supreme Court of California had any
reliable data to support the three reasons it gave for denying recovery of bystander emotional distress. But at least it did not leap
blindly into the unknown and adopt a new rule of law which had a
potential for major social consequences. It left such a change, if it
is to be made, to the legislature which is in a position to assemble
data and consider all the consequences of a proposed change.
Punitive damages is the other form of recovery which consumes resources available to compensate victims. In theory, these
damages are designed as punishment so as to deter wrongful conduct. In the case of a single tortious episode, theory may approach
reality. But in a multiple or mass tort situation punitive damages
make no sense at all. Each plaintiff is entitled to recover such damages, which results in punishing a defendant over and over again.
More objectionable is the fact that the award of such damages may
result in the lucky first plaintiffs, the jackpot winners, consuming
the resources available to the defendant and its insurance carriers
before the remaining victims recover their medical expenses and
lost income.
Another recent California case illustrates how unpredictable
4
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and devastating punitive damage awards can be. A health maintenance organization refused to pay for autologous bone marrow
transplant procedures for a woman with breast cancer, asserting
that it was not covered by its contract with patients. As you probably know, this treatment involves removing bone marrow from a
cancer patient, administrating a very high dosage of chemotherapy
far higher than would be possible without removal of the bone
marrow - and then restoring the patient's bone marrow. This
treatment has proved efficacious in the treatment of some forms of
cancer. Its effectiveness is not established with respect to other
forms of cancer. Medical opinions differ with respect to the efficaciousness of this treatment for breast cancer. It is expensive treatment and cost private sources in California $212,000 when the
HMO refused payment.
The woman involved in the California case raised the $212,000
and obtained the treatment from private sources. She lived for
eight months after the treatment. After she died, the woman's
family sued the HMO which had denied the treatment and recovered the $212,000 paid to the private provider; $12.1 million in
compensatory damages (which no doubt included pain, suffering,
and emotional distress) and $77 million in punitive damages, for a
total of $89 million.
Newspapers reported that women's health advocates praised
the award. They should have wept. Did they consider the
thousands of women, children and men who rely on this HMO for
their medical and hospital care? Did they think of the effect that
decisions like that will have upon the cost and availability of medical coverage throughout California?
This is a very common kind of suit - a plaintiff seeking to
compel an insurance company or health plan to pay for an autologous bone marrow transplant. Refusal is based upon the policy or
plan provision that the plan does not cover experimental
procedures.
Generally, the plan administrators are not heartless beasts trying to deprive desperately ill persons of needed medical care.
They are responsible for administering a plan as written, using the
limited funds available to them to provide for the medical needs of
all members of the plan.
Unanticipated demands upon plans, and court decisions that
impose obligations not provided for when plan premium rates
were set, result in other kinds of cases. Early this year, an elderly
man living only on social security and a small pension was being
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peppered by lawsuits brought by doctors and hospitals for unpaid
bills incurred during the course of his treatment for cancer. He
was covered by a union welfare plan, but the plan failed to pay his
medical bills. He sued the plan to compel payment. It developed
that the plan had been overwhelmed by rising medical costs occasioned by many factors, including, no doubt, payments for treatments which were not anticipated when the levels of employer
payments had been agreed upon. As a result, the plan could pay
only a fraction of its members' bills.
A Third Circuit case, Bixler v. Central Pennsylvania Teamsters
Health & Welfare Fund,' illustrates another effect of unanticipated
medical costs. I don't have to discuss the various legal issues involved in the case. The facts illustrate the point I am making. The
union and the employer had negotiated for a health plan, with the
employer paying specified monthly amounts. The plan administrators had to increase the amounts of the payments in order to meet
increased costs. When the collective bargaining agreement came
to an end, the employer, either unwilling or unable to pay the
higher premiums, withdrew from the plan, thus ending coverage
for all employees. During the period of bargaining impasse, plaintiffs husband incurred extraordinary medical expenses in connection with a heart attack from which he ultimately died. As a result
of the plan termination, plaintiff-widow was left without insurance
coverage and was obligated to pay enormous medical expenses,
wiping out the meager estate her husband bequeathed to her.
When we permit unlimited awards for pain and suffering and
when we permit large awards for punitive damages in actions
against health plans, we overlook the harm we may be causing
countless persons who depend upon those plans for payment of
their medical and hospital bills.
Our system for awarding damages is not the only rational system. I just completed another products liability case in which
Dutch substantive law was applicable. The product involved was
zirconium metal powder. It was shipped from a German company
to an American company which sold it to the plaintiff, a distributor
of metal products in Amsterdam. The product exploded into
flames when the plaintiff mixed a portion for resale.
The plaintiffs home was burned to the ground; he was horribly burned over most of his body; his wife was badly burned; he
spent three months in a burn unit and many more months in reha5
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bilitation. He remains forever terribly scarred in face and body.
He sued the German seller and the American reseller, charging a
lack of an adequate warning.
The parties agreed that Dutch law as it existed in 1988, the
date of the explosion, was applicable. The law on liability was similar to American products liability law. The law on damages was
quite different.
The medical expenses must have been enormous, but no doctor testified for either side and no medical expenses were proven.
The plaintiff and his wife provided eloquent testimony about his
treatment, pain and suffering. There was no medical recovery because every cent of the plaintiff's medical care had been provided
without cost to plaintiff under the Dutch health care system. Unlike the law in the United States, double recovery of medical expenses is not allowed under Dutch law. You cannot recover both
from a medical plan and from a defendant.
Plaintiffs claim for property damage was limited to $25,000,
because his fire insurance had paid $175,000 of his $200,000 fire
loss. Loss of income, to the extent not covered by the Dutch social
security system, was recoverable.
As for pain and suffering, referred to in the Dutch law as immaterial damages, Dutch courts generally consider the same factors as American courts consider. No maximum amount was
established under the Dutch code, but as a matter of practice, degrees of severity have been established, with monetary amounts being associated with each degree. The largest award in the most
severe category of immaterial damages was a 1992 award of 300,000
Netherlands guilders - or about $150,000.
As for punitive damages, there are none. As the expert legal
opinion submitted in evidence in the case stated, "Under Netherlands law the function of tort law is to compensate injured plaintiffs. It is not a function of Netherlands tort law to regulate the
behavior of potential tort feasors or to mete out punishment to
actual tort feasors."
It would be interesting to study how quickly and completely
the Dutch system compensates injured victims and the amount of
court and attorney time and expense it spends in delivering this
compensation. It would be interesting to compare the Dutch experience in this regard with the American experience.
American jurisdictions are beginning to face up to the
problems to which I have referred. The Oregon Basic Health Service Act adopted a rational approach to providing medical cover-
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age to 120,000 persons who were not qualified for medicaid but
who fell below the federal poverty level. The proposed plan recognized that medical resources are limited; it established, in a descending order of priority, a schedule of medical conditions and
treatments; it established the cost of providing the treatments and
left it to the legislature to determine how far down the list coverage
could go - it all depended upon how much the legislature was
willing to appropriate. This was a clear recognition that we can
only provide those medical services which we are willing to pay for.
I see no room in that system for a court to enter the picture and
order that treatment be provided to a greater degree than that authorized by the plan. An autologous bone marrow transplant for
any given condition would either be provided or not provided, depending upon the decision of the legislature.
Georgia has addressed the problem of punitive damages in
products liability cases. The legislature recognized that if punitive
damages are simply to deter, the punishment should be imposed
once. To impose multiple punitive damage awards in mass tort situations goes beyond deterrence and serves only to reward some
plaintiffs and their attorneys unduly and to deprive other plaintiffs
of the ability to recover anything.
The Georgia statute contains no ceiling on the amount of the
punitive damages award. But it allows but one recovery, regardless
of the number of cases against a particular defendant. The plaintiff who collects the punitive damages award must pay 75% of the
award to the state treasury.
Numerous other proposals are surfacing - for example, extending genuine no fault concepts, removing some kinds of claims
from the courts. Some of the proposals are unsound; some look
interesting.
Whatever the proposals are, the organized bar seems unreceptive. Last February I received the following notice: "Emergency
Meeting To Alert Members To Radical Legislative Proposals To
Drastically Limit If Not Totally Eliminate New Jersey Citizens' Access To The Courts" - all in capital letters, no less. In fact,
although the proposals may have been unwise, they were far from
radical. They merely nibbled around the edges of the problem.
Much serious work is being done in tort reform. Better it
would be if the organized bar joined these efforts - not to sabotage them but to find fairer, more efficient ways of distributing limited resources among injured people.
At the beginning of these remarks I referred to a sentence in
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an opinion authored by Chief Justice Vanderbilt which has remained with me through the years. In State v. Culver6 written three
months before his death, ChiefJustice Vanderbilt stated: "The nature of the common law requires that each time a rule of law is
applied it be carefully scrutinized to make sure that the conditions
and needs of the times have not so changed as to make further
application of it the instrument of injustice."7
I would suggest that the conditions and needs of the times
have changed, requiring that we carefully scrutinize facets of our
tort law, particularly as it relates to awards for pain and suffering
and for punitive damages. We should not permit rules which were
appropriate when formulated to become instruments of injustice.

6

23 N.J. 495 (1957).

7 Id. at 505.

